Of Kings and Client States

Almost two weeks ago, Anne Applebaum speculated that China is maintaining the survival of its client state so that China could the US’s response to various security situations.

During all the years of the Six Party Talks, North Korea denied that it had a HEU (highly enriched uranium) program…even though for example: 1) documents NK submitted had traces of HEU on them 2) NK’s connections to AQ Khan, or centrifuges, which brings to light why Western intelligence agencies still have not been allowed to interrogate Khan.

Now, North Korea has finally come out of the closet and announced that it would start weaponizing plutonium in response to the recently passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874.  As you may recall, China limited the scope of UNSCR 1718 by not allowing any mention of Chapter VII provisions, meaning  that no U.N. member state would be obligated to actually implement the resolution.  China played this card again with UNSCR 1874.

Since it’s almost a certainty that North Korea would react with revamped belligerence to any U.N. Security Council statement or resolution condemning North Korea’s ballistic missile and underground nuclear tests, it fuels fire Applebaum’s thoughts on China’s motivations.  Anyone, especially China, could predict Pyongyang’s response to a toothless U.N. General Assembly or Security Council resolution.

Why not include language that invokes Chapter VII?  Why not actually pass a resolution with some teeth?

It almost seems like Beijing wants Pyongyang to raise regional tensions with additional tests…

I Hate Traffick (Part 2)

There is a flurry of editorials now that the two American journalists have been sentenced to 12 years of reform through hard labor – they will presumably be sent to one of North Korea’s gulags.  One thing the editorials have in common, as the great Teddy Roosevelt said, is that they serve as ineffective and sentimental outlets for those involved.  In other words, they serve to cleanse the consciences of the editorial boards…in the absence of sustained coverage and any realistic pushes for a change in the status quo.

The New York Times editorial board makes some rather flimsy and overly-simplistic recommendations:

We hope the Obama administration is vigorously working the few diplomatic levers available. It should urge China, North Korea’s main food and fuel supplier, to speak up for the two journalists and send an American envoy to make the case directly in Pyongyang. Failing to free them would only worsen relations with President Obama, who came into office committed to reviving negotiations, and add to growing calls in Washington — and around the world — for tougher sanctions.

WSJ recommends placing North Korea back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, claiming that imprisoning the two American journalists and its provocative stances (not to forget proliferation) are terrorism.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Sunday — before yesterday’s sentencing — that the U.S. would consider putting North Korea back on the list of terror-sponsoring nations. That would recognize the North for what it is — a regime that imprisons innocents and is a threat to peace in Asia.

What’s the point?  The US can enforce sanctions with or without the terrorism list – placing North Korea back on the list would be largely symbolic and the consequence would be to piss off the NK regime even more (we’re already doing that in a number of ways with the aforementioned sanctions, South Korea’s implementations of PSI, etc.).  This would be an unnecessary move because we don’t need another impediment to possible future denuclearization talks.  Additionally,would we be willing to take NK off the list again to further “progress?”  I don’t have to remind you what that would do to weaken the legitimacy of the list and American influence in the region/world.

The Washington Post offers the only editorial that makes a mention of what Euna Lee and Laura Ling were reporting about – North Korean refugees and victims of trafficking:

But no ransom of economic aid or political concessions should be given. Instead, the administration should find ways to squeeze the regime financially — as the Bush administration did at one time — and press China to support substantial U.N. sanctions or use its considerable bilateral leverage over Pyongyang. One good way for Beijing to send a message would be to relax controls along the border and invite international aid workers to assist the desperate women and other refugees whom Ms. Lee and Ms. Ling were investigating. Mr. Kim could not endure such a policy for long.

This is an unrealistic recommendation.  It fails to recognize Beijing’s national interest in sustaining the existence of its client state.

One qualm I have with the human rights industry is its blindness in recognizing that no amount of pressure can alter Beijing’s policy of support towards dictatorships (Sudanese oil, Burmese jewels/natural gas, North Korean coal…not to mention military posturing for increased global influence and domination).  Kristof should have recognized this by now vis-a-vis Darfur.

We must operate under the assumption that China will not change its policy on refugees to be more humane.  However, the same policy recommendations have been argued for years: that China should not forcibly repatriate the approximately 300,000 North Korean refugees, should set some protections for the North Korean trafficking victims, should allow the stateless half-Chinese, half-N. Korean children to have Chinese citizenship.

While I have the utmost respect for the work of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, the committee just recently released a report, Lives for Sale, with the same tired, ineffective, unrealistic policy recommendations.

North Koreans deserve more from us.

Image from The Chosun Ilbo.

*Update*

I mulled this over for a bit: the US could only put NK back on the terrorism list for proliferation concerns.  The two American journalists who are presumably in concentration camps now could not be the reason that NK would be placed back on the list.  Why?  Because the Obama administration did an about face on detention of foreign nationals at Bagram…and Congressional refusal to accept the consequences of shutting down Gitmo.  If Obama followed through on his campaign promises to stop torture and do right by “terrorism suspects,” then maybe the US would have the moral stance to denounce the abduction of innocent people.

I’m not saying that Laura Ling and Euna Lee are on the same level as inmates at Gitmo and Bagram (though some inmates could quite possibly be innocent of whatever crimes they’re accused of).  I’m merely pointing out the inconsistency of a US argument of unlawful detentions.

I Hate Traffick (Part 1)

Nicolas Levi writes in the Daily NK:

North Korea has dispatched dozens of construction workers to Poland, sending them to sites in several cities mainly in the northwest of the country. The total number working in Poland is currently more than fifty. They live under the strict control of Polish-speaking North Korean supervisors.

….

The problem in Poland, as for many of the countries where the North Koreans are to be found, is that there are no legal restrictions or minimum wages, so as long as the North Koreans have work permits there is nothing more their host government can or need do.

Levi goes on to make the case that the unfair labor standards, harsh conditions, and the “peculiar” distribution of wages North Koreans face should be considered a form of human trafficking under EU law.

He’s wrong about the Czech Republic though.  In mid-2007, the Czech Government announced that it would not extend or issue any new work visas to North Koreans.  So in theory, there should be no North Korean laborers in the Czech Republic.  But who knows for sure unless you’re there?

Still, Bertil Lintner raises a good point:

But if they are no longer wanted in the Czech Republic, there are many other countries willing to hire North Koreans – and, as long as Pyongyang needs foreign currency, the export of labor is also likely to continue.

Personally, I am all for prioritizing those who are relatively accessible, specifically refugees.  These North Korean laborers might as well be in North Korea – their families are held in de facto ransom.  A miniscule percentage of laborers do make it out of the labor camps, but many stay for the “privelege” of serving in a foreign land.

Lastly, it’s important to not dismiss or relavitize the situation of North Korean laborers in foreign territories, as was the case with the now EPIC FAIL of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.  First, I would invite anyone who does dismiss to spend some time in the very same working conditions.  Second, just because it is “better than starving in North Korea” does not justify the exploitation and perhaps coercion of fellow human beings.

Applebaum of My Eye

Today, Anne Applebaum wrote in the Washington Post:

Let’s face it: We don’t really know why North Korea decided to test a nuclear weapon last week, why it has suddenly declared the Korean War armistice of 1953 null and void, why it has launched several test missiles and is preparing to launch others. It could be because the North Koreans are dissatisfied with the state of negotiations with Washington and want more concessions or more attention. It could be that the regime — which is no longer capable of delivering regular food supplies, or even reliable electricity, to its people — wanted to strengthen its grip on power. It could be something else altogether. Personally, I favor another scenario, equally speculative: Perhaps the North Koreans have stepped up their war rhetoric, and their war preparations, because China wants them to do so. I cannot prove that this is the case — just as no one else can prove any of their theories about North Korea

It’s pretty much common knowledge that China has three known reasons for allowing the existence of its client state.  First, China does not want to see a total collapse of the North Korean economy that would send millions of refugees into NE China.  Second, cheap labor and cheap natural resources.  Third, China wants to preserve North Korea as a security buffer.

Applebaum goes on to argue that another possible goal for keeping Pyongyang around is to test the US’s response to various security situations: nuclear and arms proliferation.  I see this as an ancillary benefit to the aforementioned points.  Still, Applebaum makes an interesting connection between China’s ambitions for regional/global dominance and motivations for keeping the North Korean regime around.

Also in the news, Kim Jong Il named Kim Jong Un, his youngest son, the heir to the hereditary, Communist dictatorship.  I wonder what KJU’s nickname will be (KIS – Great Leader; KJI – Dear Leader; KJU – Leader Dearest?).  In any case, predicting his leadership style and engagement with the West is too speculative for me to comment on.

Actually, that type of commentary is valuable…for me to poop on.

*Update*

OFK’s Jodi Kiely opines that China may be taking on a more proactive role with regard to North Korea’s nuclear intransigence. While I have no doubt that Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the US have been pressuring Beijing to do this, I still think that this is still rhetorical lip service and will have little substance to it.